Materia
Elección Social y Bienestar / Social Choice and Welfare
Datos generales de la materia
- Modalidad
- Presencial
- Idioma
- Inglés
Descripción y contextualización de la asignatura
Social Choice theory is concerned with the analysis of collective decision-making procedures. It includes the study of several models for aggregating individual inputs into collective outputs such as methods of voting, utilitarian and egalitarian methods and so on, as well as with the foundations of social welfare. The course deals with both theoretical and empirical questions and devote some hours to explore STATA possibilities in this field.Profesorado
Nombre | Institución | Categoría | Doctor/a | Perfil docente | Área | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ARISTONDO ECHEBERRIA, OIHANA | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea | Profesorado Agregado | Doctora | Bilingüe | Matemática Aplicada | oihana.aristondo@ehu.eus |
LASSO DE LA VEGA MARTINEZ, CASILDA | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea | Profesorado Catedratico De Universidad | Doctora | No bilingüe | Economía Aplicada | casilda.lassodelavega@ehu.eus |
Competencias
Denominación | Peso |
---|---|
Basándose en los principios de análisis económico, entender como el diseño de los sistemas electorales afecta al resultado de la elección | 50.0 % |
Comprender el concepto de funciones de evaluación social como herramienta de medida de desigualdad y pobreza | 50.0 % |
Tipos de docencia
Tipo | Horas presenciales | Horas no presenciales | Horas totales |
---|---|---|---|
Magistral | 24 | 36 | 60 |
Seminario | 16 | 24 | 40 |
Actividades formativas
Denominación | Horas | Porcentaje de presencialidad |
---|---|---|
Clases expositivas | 16.0 | 100 % |
Ejercicios | 8.0 | 100 % |
Lectura y análisis prácticos | 60.0 | 0 % |
Tutorías | 16.0 | 100 % |
Sistemas de evaluación
Denominación | Ponderación mínima | Ponderación máxima |
---|---|---|
Examen escrito | 60.0 % | 80.0 % |
Trabajos Prácticos | 20.0 % | 40.0 % |
Resultados del aprendizaje de la asignatura
By the end of the course you will be able to:
1. be familiar with the most used inequality, poverty and welfare indicators;
2. recognize the different properties and behaviours of those indicators;
3. distinguish the different approaches to measure inequality and poverty;
4. understand how inequality and poverty are measured in practice;
5. make robust comparisons using the Lorenz curves, the generalized Lorenz curves and the TIP curves;
6. use inequality and poverty modules in STATA;
7. use empirical evidence to interpret the evolution of inequality and poverty;
8. locate efficiently a facility;
9. understand the equality / efficiency dilemma;
10. find the location of a facility under an egalitarian, utilitarian, maxmin,
minmax or leximin criteria;
11. share project costs under an egalitarian or maximin criteria;
12. be familiar with the basic voting rules: majority, weighted majority,
qualified majority, Condorcet’s winner, Borda’s method and dictatorship;
13. understand the basic properties satisfied by a social aggregator: anonymity, positive responsive, neutrality, unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives;
14. show if a given rule satisfies some properties.
Convocatoria ordinaria: orientaciones y renuncia
Coursework will be weighted as follows:Final exam 35 %
STATA assignment 30 %
Additional assignments 25 %
Attendance + in-class assignment points 10 %
• More than two unexcused absences may result in a failing grade for the attendance contribution.
Temario
1 Inequality, Poverty and Welfare• Basic notions about Inequality Measures.
• Lorenz dominance.
• More properties: decomposability and subgroup consistency.
• Social Welfare based (normative) Inequality Measures.
• Basic notions about Poverty Measures.
2 Stata application
• Basic Packages
• Microdata
• Computing
• Inequality and Poverty measures
• Inequality and Poverty curves
2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorems
• May’s Theorem.
• Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.
3 Welfarism
• The framework
• Egalitarianism versus (classical) Utilitarianism:
• Egalitarian principle
• Unanimity (or Pareto optimality) principle
• The equality-efficiency dilemma
• The maximin utility program
• The leximin social welfare ordering
• Classical Utilitarianism
• Social Welfare Orderings
Bibliografía
Bibliografía básica
References:• Satya Chakravarty (2009), Inequality, Polarization and Poverty, (online edition available in the library website)
• Frank Cowell (2009), Measuring Inequality
http://econdse.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Cowell-measuring-inequality.pdf <br /><br /> • Jacques Silber (1999), Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement (ed. Kluwer). <br /><br /> • Bhaskar Dutta (2002), “Inequality, Poverty and Welfare”, Chapter 12 in the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. <br /><br /> • May, Kenneth O. (1952). "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions", Econometrica 20, 680–684. <br /><br /> • Arrow, K.J. (1950). "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", Journal of Political Economy 58, 328–346. <br /><br /> • Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly “Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework”, Chapter 1 in the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1, Edited by K.J Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura 2002 Elsevier <br /><br /> • Hervé Moulin H. (1991) Axioms of cooperative decision making”, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1. <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />
Revistas
Journal of Economic Inequality: https://www.springer.com/journal/10888.Review of Income Inequality: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754991?af=R.
Social Choice and Welfare: https://www.springer.com/journal/355.